Why Are Gulf Countries Not Speaking Out Against Their Rival Iran?

Saudi Arabia’s economic centers are vulnerable to Iranian missiles, so are the UAE’s main cities Dubai and Abu Dhabi

Hussain Abdul-Hussain

Algemeiner

Since 1979, Iran has been a problem for Arab Gulf capitals. Tehran has exported its radical Islamism and terrorism across the region, built loyalist militias, agitated popular opinion against Gulf governments, and pursued a nuclear weapon.

Yet, when Israel sent its fighter jets to finally confront the troublemaking Iranian regime, all six nations of the Gulf Countries Council (GCC) behaved in a mind-boggling way: They denounced “the Israeli aggression” and worked the phones, including with President Trump, to “de-escalate” the situation. There is an explanation for the Gulf’s behavior.

Abdul-Rahman al-Rashed, one of the sharpest Saudi intellectuals, explained the Saudi thinking. In an interview last September, Rashed said that Riyadh lost confidence in America’s commitment to Saudi security.

In 2019, Iran struck Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais. After saying that America was “locked and loaded” to punish Iran in response, President Trump called off the American strike.

Rashed argues that Riyadh was not seeking the US military to fight on behalf of the Saudis, but that the kingdom believed it was protected by American deterrence against its enemies — and Washington let them down.

The Saudi intellectual also said that war with Iran would be much costlier to the Saudis than to the Iranians. The kingdom is among the top 20 economies in the world, and has six or more thriving economic centers. Iran’s puny economy, however, means that Tehran has little to lose in case of war.

Because American unpredictability eroded Saudi confidence, the kingdom decided to seek an alternative. In 2023, Riyadh restored relations with Tehran. The agreement was signed in Beijing, in the hope that China — the senior partner in its alliance with Iran — could guarantee Iranian non-belligerence toward the kingdom.

To curry more favor with Tehran, in April 2025, Riyadh deployed its second-in-command and MBS’s brother, Defense Minister Khaled, to Iran. The Saudi official warned Iranians of an impending strike if Tehran did not give up its uranium enrichment. To its detriment, Tehran ignored the Saudi warning.

Even after Israel’s impressive opening act in the war with Islamist Iran, the Saudis still did not rejoice. Perhaps Riyadh calculated that if the Islamist regime in Tehran falls, they will be relieved, but if it does not, the Saudis would have curried enough favor with the Iranians that would spare the kingdom Tehran’s post-war wrath.

Hedging has also been part of the calculus of the second biggest GCC country, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE had a bitter military experience with Trump. In 2019, when pro-Emirati forces were about to take the strategic Port of Hodeidafrom the Houthis in Yemen, Washington urged them to step back. Once again, an Arab state felt it could not count on the US for support against Iran.

And just as Saudi Arabia’s economic centers are vulnerable to Iranian missiles, so are the UAE’s main cities — Dubai and Abu Dhabi — which the late Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah called “glass cities” and threatened to smash.

Under President Biden, the Gulf had an even tougher time dealing with Washington. Biden had promised to turn Saudi Arabia into a pariah state, stopped the sale of offensive weapons to Riyadh in the middle of its war against the Houthis, suspended an F-35 sale to the UAE, and removed the Houthis from the US terrorism list.

Biden reversed all these measures, but the damage had already been done. When he knocked on Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s doors, inviting them to join a US-led coalition against the Houthis, the two Gulf governments balked. America’s credibility problem persisted.

Without American deterrence and enough air defense, the economically prosperous Saudis and Emiratis have much more to lose than the impoverished Iranians and their militias. This is why, while wishing that the Iran regime would collapse, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have not publicly expressed such a sentiment. Unofficial Saudi voices might still be heard on social media, capturing the true anti-Iran popular sentiment — but the governments themselves are taking a “wait and see” approach.

In May, President Trump visited Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha (Qatar’s capital). Qatar’s policy significantly differs from that of its two bigger GCC neighbors.

On Tuesday, former Qatari Prime Minister Hamad Bin Jasim, argued on X that “the Gulf region will pay, and is already paying, a heavy price” for the Israeli-Iranian war. “It is not in the interest of Gulf states to see Iran, their large neighbor, collapse. Such a situation would inevitably lead to a destructive spiral … with severe consequences for everyone.”

To avoid such an eventuality, Hamad suggested that Gulf capitals use their influence with Washington to “immediately halt the Israeli madness.”

Also on X, a Saudi columnist immediately rebutted the former Qatari official. “Your tweet reflects [only] the Qatari position on the Iranian regime,” wrote Saleh al-Fhaid.

“Many Gulf citizens [believe] that Iran is more dangerous to them than Israel,” Fhaid added. “The overthrow of the mullahs’ regime is thus in the interest of Gulf states, and the price of this regime’s demise, however painful, harsh, and costly, is far less than the state of attrition that this regime has been practicing against Gulf states for four decades.”

Fhaid then explained the motive behind Qatar’s pro-Iran position: “Some Gulf states view the mullahs’ regime as a guarantee for creating a regional balance. Other Gulf states view the mullahs’ regime as an existential threat.”

The debate in GCC nations, over the fate of Iran’s Islamist regime, is vibrant, even if muffled. The general sentiment wants to see the regime gone. As Fhaid spelled it out, the governments of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Kuwait see Islamist Iran as an existential threat. Qatar and Oman believe that they can use Iran to offset Saudi Arabia. All six governments pretend that neutrality and mediation is their best bet — but each one of the two blocs hopes for a different outcome.