Thank you for an insightful article. I have only recently subscribed, having been introduced to your admirable site by Małgorzata Koraszewska.
I am struck by the line, "Israel to get out of the hair of Palestinians, withdraw from the West Bank as much as militarily possible, and let the Palestinians govern themselves and reap the economic benefits of such autonomy that can come closest to being a state."
I wonder how you reconcile this recommendation with what has transpired in Gaza since exactly this was tried.
Thanks for subscribing Anjuli. Israel has no access to Areas A and B (only militarily), which is 40 percent of the West Bank. Problem is when majority of Palestinians commute between the territories they control, they go through Area C, which is under Israeli control. Now if checkpoints become a non-issue, if Israel tries to expand Areas A and B as much as possible in ways that do not weaken its security control (to prevent a Hamas take over like in Gaza), then things can improve for Palestinians. There is a lot that can be done to improve the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank, short of weakening Israel's security oversight. There was glimpses of improvement under Salam Fayyad, but this was undermined for various reasons. Also, if the West Bank becomes a better model than Gaza, Hamas itself would weaken in both WB and Gaza.
1. "if checkpoints become a non-issue, if Israel tries to expand Areas A and B as much as possible in ways that do not weaken its security control (to prevent a Hamas take over like in Gaza), then things can improve for Palestinians."
There's a lot packed into this one. "if checkpoints become a non-issue, then things can improve for Palestinians." If this were so, then there would have to be some explanation for why things have not improved for Gazans, where there are no checkpoints anywhere within that territory. Might the explanation be related to the "various reasons" Salam Fayyad failed?
"In ways that do not weaken its [Israel's] security control (to prevent a Hamas take over like in Gaza)". If I understand you correctly, Hamas took over Gaza because the PA, rather than the IDF, was in control of it at the time. If this is so, then is it up to the IDF, rather than the Palestinians themselves, to ensure there is no Hamas takeover?
2. "There is a lot that can be done to improve the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank." One might ask who has what responsibility for improving the lives of the Palestinians. I raise this because it is not clear whom you have in mind when you say, “There is a lot that can be done.” Perhaps you’ve already written in detail about this and I’m not aware.
3. When you say that there were glimpses of improvement under Salam Fayyad, then presumably, responsibility for improving the lives of Palestinians rests with the Palestinians. In this case I wonder how the unspecified reasons for Fayyad’s failure weigh up against Israel’s security measures. There may be reasons over and above the example of Gaza lacking internal checkpoints, which account for the difficult lives of the Palestinians.
4. One might give the Palestinians the benefit of the doubt and say they did not know that the Gaza regime would turn out as it did, but given the way the Gazans destroyed the economic kickstarters the Israelis left for them (greenhouses, warehouses, factories) when they assumed autonomy, they do not need Hamas to reduce them to poverty. They are perfectly capable of doing that by themselves. In the Gaza case, they did so not through neglect, but through deliberate arson the moment they got their hands on the assets. Also, the way the PA rejected the US’s $50billion aid package that included a great deal more than just autonomy, again makes me want to take a closer look at those various reasons for Fayyad’s failure. So I am not at all sure whether, “if the West Bank becomes a better model than Gaza, Hamas itself would weaken in both WB and Gaza.” The evidence suggests that models play little role in this game.
Certainly, it is the Palestinians’ business whether they want to improve their lives or not, but I see no evidence of their wanting to do so. I find it hard to share your optimism. I think Palestinian priorities may be different to what your article seems to assume.
When the next peace treaty is signed, pay attention to who celebrates and who does not. That will tell you who really values peace, and who does not.
Thank you for an insightful article. I have only recently subscribed, having been introduced to your admirable site by Małgorzata Koraszewska.
I am struck by the line, "Israel to get out of the hair of Palestinians, withdraw from the West Bank as much as militarily possible, and let the Palestinians govern themselves and reap the economic benefits of such autonomy that can come closest to being a state."
I wonder how you reconcile this recommendation with what has transpired in Gaza since exactly this was tried.
Anjuli Pandavar www.murtaddtohuman.org
Thanks for subscribing Anjuli. Israel has no access to Areas A and B (only militarily), which is 40 percent of the West Bank. Problem is when majority of Palestinians commute between the territories they control, they go through Area C, which is under Israeli control. Now if checkpoints become a non-issue, if Israel tries to expand Areas A and B as much as possible in ways that do not weaken its security control (to prevent a Hamas take over like in Gaza), then things can improve for Palestinians. There is a lot that can be done to improve the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank, short of weakening Israel's security oversight. There was glimpses of improvement under Salam Fayyad, but this was undermined for various reasons. Also, if the West Bank becomes a better model than Gaza, Hamas itself would weaken in both WB and Gaza.
There are four points to respond to, really:
1. "if checkpoints become a non-issue, if Israel tries to expand Areas A and B as much as possible in ways that do not weaken its security control (to prevent a Hamas take over like in Gaza), then things can improve for Palestinians."
There's a lot packed into this one. "if checkpoints become a non-issue, then things can improve for Palestinians." If this were so, then there would have to be some explanation for why things have not improved for Gazans, where there are no checkpoints anywhere within that territory. Might the explanation be related to the "various reasons" Salam Fayyad failed?
"In ways that do not weaken its [Israel's] security control (to prevent a Hamas take over like in Gaza)". If I understand you correctly, Hamas took over Gaza because the PA, rather than the IDF, was in control of it at the time. If this is so, then is it up to the IDF, rather than the Palestinians themselves, to ensure there is no Hamas takeover?
2. "There is a lot that can be done to improve the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank." One might ask who has what responsibility for improving the lives of the Palestinians. I raise this because it is not clear whom you have in mind when you say, “There is a lot that can be done.” Perhaps you’ve already written in detail about this and I’m not aware.
3. When you say that there were glimpses of improvement under Salam Fayyad, then presumably, responsibility for improving the lives of Palestinians rests with the Palestinians. In this case I wonder how the unspecified reasons for Fayyad’s failure weigh up against Israel’s security measures. There may be reasons over and above the example of Gaza lacking internal checkpoints, which account for the difficult lives of the Palestinians.
4. One might give the Palestinians the benefit of the doubt and say they did not know that the Gaza regime would turn out as it did, but given the way the Gazans destroyed the economic kickstarters the Israelis left for them (greenhouses, warehouses, factories) when they assumed autonomy, they do not need Hamas to reduce them to poverty. They are perfectly capable of doing that by themselves. In the Gaza case, they did so not through neglect, but through deliberate arson the moment they got their hands on the assets. Also, the way the PA rejected the US’s $50billion aid package that included a great deal more than just autonomy, again makes me want to take a closer look at those various reasons for Fayyad’s failure. So I am not at all sure whether, “if the West Bank becomes a better model than Gaza, Hamas itself would weaken in both WB and Gaza.” The evidence suggests that models play little role in this game.
Certainly, it is the Palestinians’ business whether they want to improve their lives or not, but I see no evidence of their wanting to do so. I find it hard to share your optimism. I think Palestinian priorities may be different to what your article seems to assume.
Anjuli Pandavar
www.murtaddtohuman.org